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From Pictures to Policy: How Does Humanitarian Reporting Have an Influence? 
Suzanne Franks 
 
News coverage does not in itself determine policy despite what proponents of the CNN 
effect might content. But it does wield influence in the democratic interaction between 
public and government. (Seib, 2002) 
 
The degree of influence of media coverage upon policy is part of a longstanding debate. There 
are many and varied strands to these relationships and the way that media coverage may or may 
not influence political decision making in relation to foreign policy. Trying to separate out the 
precise impact of media effects is invariably complex and often opaque. This chapter analyses 
the state of the contemporary debates. But it also uses historical analysis to assess the arguments 
about how media influence affected decision making in the period after the television coverage 
of the Ethiopian famine in the 1980s, which was a key moment in the way that television 
reported humanitarian crises. 
 
CNN Effect Defined 
The term ‘CNN effect’ was first formally used during the first Gulf War in 1991 to describe the 
way that real-time news coverage of foreign stories appeared to affect the decision making of 
political elites, either directly or through the influence upon domestic audiences. It was defined 
as a ‘generic term for the ability of real time communications technology via the news media to 
provoke major response from domestic audiences and political elites to both global and national 
  
events’ (Robinson, 2002). But versions of this argument that media coverage influence foreign 
policy had been around already for years. 
The distinction which arose in the early 1990s was not just the wider question of media 
influence upon policy, but specifically the way that real-time live pictures, often transmitted via 
newly emerging 24 hour news TV channels, might potentially have a role in shaping decision 
making. (Robinson, 2011) And in recent years this has widened into a consideration of how an 
ever-changing range of online and social media might influence considerations of foreign policy. 
Yet in the period since 1991, as the debates surrounding the CNN effect developed, there have 
been many further discussions about cases, where retrospectively media coverage may have 
appeared to have had an effect upon foreign policy or at least prompted action in relation to 
foreign events. There have been considerable debates between those who highlighted the effects 
of media reporting upon political decision making and those who downplayed the role of the 
media (Robinson, 2000). 
So the overall term ‘CNN effect’ subsequently became used retrospectively to analyse the 
more widespread effects of media coverage upon previous foreign crises, in a period long before 
the advent of 24 hour real-time news coverage. It is particularly linked to so-called humanitarian 
reporting and the presentation of extreme suffering as a driver for politicians to react. But the 
question of how this mechanism might operate, let alone whether there is in fact a causation 
between pictures of humanitarian distress and policy response is complex and often unresolved. 
In fact according to this interpretation versions of a CNN effect (when defined as the 
wider impact of media upon policy) was already discernible even centuries earlier, where there 
are examples of press coverage of a crisis stimulating a response to ‘do something’ among 
readers and politicians. The Bulgarian atrocities in the nineteenth century are an early example. 
  
In the mid-1870s there was dramatic newspaper coverage of the Turkish slaughter of the 
Bulgarian Christians, in the reporting of the American journalist A. J. MacGahan for the London 
Daily News and by W. T. Stead in the Northern Echo (Goldsworthy, 2006) These articles 
prompted former prime minister William Gladstone to produce a famous pamphlet The 
Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East. And the reporting ultimately inspired Gladstone 
to return to active politics and to campaign energetically on behalf of the Christian population in 
order to persuade the British government, in spite of Disraeli’s initial indifference, to become 
involved (Little, 2012). The media coverage of the Turkish atrocities was a critical catalyst in 
Gladstone’s campaign for Western intervention and the establishment of the Christian state of 
Bulgaria. So although the term was only invented during the first Gulf War in 1991, the 
phenomenon has been around in different versions for a very long time. 
 
Differing Views of Influence 
In general politicians have tended to be critical of what they regard as the overweening and 
inappropriate power of the media—and in particular television pictures—as a catalyst for public 
pressure, especially on foreign policy. The former UK Conservative foreign secretary Douglas 
Hurd felt strongly about the inappropriate pressure of media coverage as an influence in policy 
making in particular during the Balkan crises of the 1990s. He gave a speech in 1993 titled The 
Power of Comment which the Times reported as ‘Foreign Secretary warns of Media role’ 
(“Douglas Hurd Speech”, 1993) and the Daily Telegraph as ‘Hurd Hits out Again at Media’ 
(1993). And the American journalist George Kennan made similar disapproving observations 
about US policy and intervention in Somalia. Writing in the New York Times he argued that the 
media was effectively dictating foreign policy making and had triggered the ill-thought-out US 
  
intervention (Kennan, 1993). Two years later, in 1995, the former Secretary-General of the 
United Nations Boutrous Boutrous Ghali went as far as saying that CNN operated like the 
sixteenth member of the UN Security Council. 
We have 16 members in the Security Council: the 15 country members plus CNN. Long-
term work doesn’t interest you because the span of attention of the public is limited. Out of 
20 peacekeeping operations you are interested in one or two . . . And because of the 
limelight on one or two, I am not able to obtain the soldiers or the money or the attention 
for the other 17 operations. (Smillie & Minear 2004) 
In 1999 Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, made a similar observation is his Chicago speech 
on foreign policy when he remarked that politicians were ‘still fending off the danger of letting 
wherever CNN roves be the cattle prod to take a global conflict seriously’ (Blair, 1999). 
Summarising the various complaints by politicians, Piers Robinson points out ‘the CNN 
effect has been asserted rather than demonstrated . . . and became an untested and 
unsubstantiated “fact” for many in foreign policy and humanitarian circles’ (Robinson, 2002). 
These continual assertions about the inappropriate influence of media coverage on foreign policy 
decision making were important in encouraging a substantial academic examination of the 
matter. 
Over recent decades there has been a vigorous debate about how instrumental media 
coverage really has been in affecting foreign policy. An early example of this had been a 
retrospective reassessment of the role of the media in the Vietnam War. Perceived wisdom had 
always asserted that the media had a major effect upon the conduct of the war. The images of 
civilian suffering combined with the ‘body bag’ pictures of the US military were supposed to 
have affected the decisions in Washington on the conduct of the war. And in later years, during 
  
the Iraq War for example, access to this kind of material of returning bodies was, as a result of 
these sensitivities, much more limited. However Daniel Hallin, in the The Uncensored War 
(1986), argues that the effect of the media during Vietnam was, in fact, far more subtle than 
originally assumed and that the media were actually reflecting a consensus against the war that 
had already been reached within important parts of American society and politics at the time. In 
other words it was not the direct effect of the media upon domestic American opinion that caused 
popular opposition to the war, which then influenced politicians. 
This more measured view of the CNN effect and a modification to the way that the 
causation really works has continued in more recent times. Nik Gowing (1994) and Steven 
Livingston (1997) have argued that it is only in the case of weak governments and indecisive 
policy that the impact of media coverage will change directions of foreign intervention. Media 
reporting will have an effect if there is a policy vacuum or moments of ‘policy panic’. According 
to Philp Seib, quoting the US TV correspondent Peter Jennings, ‘Political leadership trumps 
good television every time. As influential as television can be it is most influential in the absence 
of decisive political leadership’ (2002). So the CNN effect will only take place in a policy 
vacuum. Seib concludes unambiguously that the argument that ‘televised images especially 
heart-wrenching pictures of suffering civilians will so stir public opinion that government 
officials will be forced to adjust policy to conform to that opinion’ may sound appealing, but 
although ‘there is a certain logic to the theory and it cheers (some) journalists who like to think 
that they are powerful . . . there is a fundamental problem: it just ain’t so at least not as a 
straightforward cause and effect process’ (2002). 
The Western intervention in support of the Kurds in Northern Iraq during the period 
following the first Gulf War in 1991 is sometimes cited as an example of a CNN effect, because 
  
policy appeared to shift in reaction to media coverage (Shaw, 1996). There were grim pictures of 
Kurds huddled on cold mountains, which supposedly were significant in the formation of the 
policy of creating safe havens pursued by John Major’s government. Shaw distinguishes this 
crisis and the way the media were influential as an example of policymaking on the hoof in 
response to dramatic media pictures. A gradual consensus emerged from these various analyses 
that television pictures do inspire public opinion, but if they result in a (successful) call for action 
they are much more likely to trigger calls for aid and humanitarian assistance. It is less likely that 
they are the source of pressure for sustained political intervention or military force. 
Nevertheless Susan Carruthers is not so certain that media is so limited in its impact on 
policy—she also casts doubt upon a methodology that is all about interviewing politicians and 
asking them how much they were swayed by dramatic media coverage (2011). Her argument is 
that any politician worth his or her salt will say that they remained steadfast despite being 
unreasonably pressured by the media. This puts the comments by politicians like Douglas Hurd 
in a different context. When they complain about a CNN effect they are really talking about 
feeling under pressure, not that they necessarily give in to the pressure. Carruthers frames the 
issue as the diffuse effect that media coverage has upon public opinion, which then in turn may 
influence democratic leaders. Yet here again the kind of intervention is far more likely to be a 
call for humanitarian assistance rather than direct military involvement, especially ground troops. 
Andrew Natsios also observes, 
The CNN factor may have consequences for fundraising for NGOs and for sustained 
congressional funding but is not essential to early (military) intervention except where 
troops for security are critically important. Even then media coverage may not be sufficient 
to force a robust international response. (1996) 
  
This is consistent with Michael Ignatieff’s observations. He characterises the CNN effect 
not as a real trigger for action to change. He argues that television pictures are more likely to 
give us a moral drama with sentimental tales of suffering using a poor country as a backdrop, 
which serves to stimulate exercises in generosity and even reinforces the donor’s sensation of 
moral superiority, so that the ‘CNN effect will have little effect to drive policy but will have a 
big effect to promote humanitarian intervention’ (Ignatieff, 1998; Harvey, 2012). If the media 
does have a role in prompting military action it is at most able to influence the timing of an 
intervention. So, for example, the Kosovo crisis in 1999 is deemed to be an example where 
media coverage prompted intervention (Bahador, 2007). But Rupert Smith argues that in the case 
of Kosovo the use of force would have happened anyway and the effect of the media pressure 
was that it potentially speeded up the process (Smith, 2006). In the Syrian crisis during the 
period 2011- 2013 once again there was plenty of impetus for humanitarian assistance, but the 
media images did not result in the use of outside military force despite what some politicians in 
Western nations may have wanted.  
So the consensus is that large-scale international relief efforts and also a ‘something must 
be done’ urgency to intervene may be affected by media coverage, and especially pictures, but it 
is not clear that this extends beyond the impulse to donate aid, either to persuade governments to 
commit aid or for the public to make their own contributions. Furthermore there are some 
instances where governments might even encourage media coverage as a way of gaining public 
support for a policy which they were already keen to promote.
1
 This use of the CNN effect by 
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In a keynote speech by Gordon Brown at a Vatican seminar on development 9 July 2004, Brown 
recognised the importance of popular pressure on aid policy, and also after the July 2005 Gleneagles 
G8 summit he acknowledged the role of international media pressure on those governments initially 
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politicians as an enabling effect is another dimension discussed by both Robinson and Shaw. 
Nicholas Wheeler points out how the media can be used by policymakers to build support for an 
intervention that they want to pursue for non-media reasons (Wheeler, 2003). This was 
discernable in the question of whether the West should intervene in the Syrian crisis in August 
2013, following the use by the Syrian regime of chemical weapons. Media coverage was 
prompting humanitarian assistance both in private donations and encouraging governments to 
act. However there was less enthusiasm for any kind of official military intervention, as had been 
the case in Libya eighteen months earlier. The UK government under David Cameron tried to 
create a consensus towards military support for the Syrian rebels and media coverage (much of it 
obtained from locally based citizen journalists) formed a key part of this, since it was the only 
way that the Western public could engage with the crisis. Nevertheless, despite the powerful 
media images of suffering and atrocities, this was not sufficient and the consensus amongst the 
public (demonstrated in opinion polls) and the formal rejection of a motion in the UK Parliament 
showed that there was not national support for military intervention, despite the Government’s 
view. 
 
Media and Humanitarian Appeals 
What is now apparent is that there are in fact a number of variants of a CNN effect and the way it 
might impact upon policy. The narrow view is only concerned with direct foreign policy 
responses as a reaction to media coverage. Here the consensus is now that there is limited 
connection, with the exception of humanitarian intervention. However there is also a wider 
interpretation of a CNN effect which concerns the influence of media coverage of foreign events 
on mainstream domestic opinion and responses—in particular the role of philanthropy. In this 
  
case there does however appear to be a correlation between the nature and level of media 
coverage and the overall scale of humanitarian assistance. In the article ‘Humanitarian Crises: 
Testing the CNN effect’, Olsten, Carstensen, and Hoyen contrast the coverage of the Orissa 
flooding following the cyclone that hit India in late 1999 with the Mozambique floods in early 
2000 (Olsen & Nils Carstensen, 2003). The Indian authorities severely restricted media access to 
the flooded areas in Orissa and there was very little television coverage. Meanwhile the 
Mozambique flooding attracted dramatic coverage, with helicopters rescuing people from the 
tops of trees. Its climax was the remarkable rescue by a passing South African helicopter of a 
woman giving birth. The international aid response to the Mozambique floods was substantial 
whereas the response to the floods in Orissa was far more limited by comparison. There was a 
Disasters Emergency Committee
 
(DEC) appeal for funds to Mozambique, launched in March 
2000, which raised more than £30 million—at that point the third highest total for any of their 
broadcast appeals. Beyond this there was substantial official aid offered to Mozambique—
including of course the helicopters from South Africa that made possible the remarkable rescues. 
Mozambique welcomed international relief assistance but this was largely dependent upon 
sufficient media coverage of the disaster, which it was prepared to facilitate. 
There had also been a DEC appeal in November 1999 for the flooding in the Eastern 
Indian state of Orissa. Although it will accept official charitable donations to disasters, the Indian 
government does not usually request international assistance for disaster aid, which may be part 
of the reason that it was not concerned to give media access to the affected area. In contrast to 
Mozambique this appeal raised a mere £7 million. Moreover the Orissa appeal happened first 
which would suggest that there might have been a sense of déjà vu by the time the Mozambique 
appeal took place. And the Orissa appeal was in the comparatively ‘fruitful’ Christmas period, 
  
when charitable donations are traditionally more forthcoming. Yet clearly other reasons led to 
the Mozambique appeal yielding a higher level of donations. The images are critical in inspiring 
assistance. The DEC were aware in their assessment that the limited media coverage of the 
Indian crisis would result in a lower level of donations than for other emergencies but still felt 
the appeal was worth making. In the official request to the BBC chairman to authorise the 
broadcast appeals it was pointed out that over the previous year there had been appeals for the 
Kosovo crisis and a hurricane in Central America, ‘however . . . the scale of human distress is 
actually greater (in Orissa) than in either of these other two emergencies’.2 This view was 
supported by the Department for International Development (DfID) and the estimates were that 
10 to 15 million people were affected and 2 million were homeless with millions at risk of 
cholera and other epidemics. The Kosovo appeal was launched in response to overwhelming 
media coverage of the refugee crisis. It is interesting that this appeal with its repeated images of 
(light-skinned) refugees on cold mountains yielded £53 million, which was at that time the 
highest ever level of donations to a broadcast appeal.
3
 
However an interesting contrast with the Orissa appeal occurred a year later when a 
devastating earthquake affected the state of Gujurat in northwest India. Once again the Indian 
government said that it would accept charitable donations and an appeal was launched by the 
DEC in February 2001. Tony Vaux, who once worked for Oxfam and later wrote about the role 
of NGOs, produced an assessment of the Gujarat appeal contrasting the response to the two 
Indian disasters of the Gujarat earthquake with the Orissa floods (Vaux, 2001). There was far 
greater television and media coverage of the earthquake and the public response in the UK was 
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 BBC Management Registry B114-4 undated memo on ‘DEC key aspects’ Kosovo appeal was in April 
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correspondingly three times greater than for the flooding. The DEC appeal for Gujarat raised £24 
million, more than three times as much as the total for Orissa. Although the UK has closer links 
with Gujarat than Orissa it is still hard to explain this discrepancy, except through the images. 
The response to different disasters is so variable because ‘there is no objective reason but simply 
a subjective response to selected images.’4 Vaux argues that the reason that donations to 
emergency appeals constantly break new records is that the global media are better and better at 
producing shock horror images. The coverage of the Asian tsunami at the end of 2004 was a 
prime example, exceeding all previous totals. Hilary Benn as international development secretary 
observed in 2006 that fundraising appeals yielded $10 per head for the humanitarian crisis in the 




In the wake of extensive media coverage of a crisis, Smillie and Minear comment on the 
intense pressure that governments may face in being seen to do something to alleviate suffering, 
even if it is, practically speaking, of little use. In the case of the Mozambique floods, the UK 
Government responded by sending some helicopters. This entailed a huge cost because of the 
long distances and anyway the helicopters arrived too late to be of much use, ‘giving the media a 
second stick with which to beat the government’ (Smillie & Minear, 2004). It would have made 
more sense to contribute towards the helicopters easily accessible from South Africa. 
In recent years the CNN effect has not even been perceived as a necessary stimulant to 
humanitarian action. Political interests and proximity are cited as more powerful stimulants to 
the decision to send official aid (Smillie & Minear, 2004). Examples cited are those such as the 
case of North Korea where there is almost no media coverage and yet because of strategic 
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 Interview with Tony Vaux, June 2005. 
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 Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development, speaking at Media and Politics 
seminar, Nuffield College, Oxford University, 13 October 2006. 
  
interests there is still significant humanitarian assistance. Similarly according to Smillie and 
Minear, the conflicts in both Angola and Sudan were for many years the subject of minimal 
media attention and yet they received a reasonable amount of aid. The current consensus is that 
just as the CNN effect is most likely to affect foreign policy where there is no strong political 
direction, it is most likely to influence humanitarian intervention where there are no particular 
strategic interests involved. In those cases the media may have a substantial effect on prompting 
calls for wide-scale assistance and aid. As the strategic certainties of the Cold War eroded during 
the 1990s, media coverage was more effective at prompting humanitarian relief. It appears 
therefore that the media might be a sufficient but not always a necessary trigger to sending 
official aid, even if they are much more crucial in the galvanising of individual and private 
donations. 
So the history of the CNN effect is that the original view (held by politicians and some 
self-important journalists) was that the media coverage could play a critical role in pushing 
governments in foreign-policy decision making. Then there was an academic consideration of 
the problem which broadly concluded that it is only in cases of policy uncertainty and lack of 
direction that the media could have a more significant effect. This was far less likely to have 
been the case during the Cold War period when foreign policy was more likely to be driven by 
overriding global strategic concerns. An exception was made for humanitarian suffering and 
relief where the literature concluded that the CNN effect was powerful, but it is important to 
understand that this is largely because of the way in which it was refracted through public 
opinion. However in more recent years, it seems that this conclusion too may be tempered so that 
even in matters of sending official foreign aid there is not necessarily a strong relationship to 
media pressure, provided governments have a strong strategic goal. 
  
 
CNN Effect and Ethiopia—a Case Study? 
The media coverage of the Ethiopian famine in 1984–1985 is one of the best-known examples of 
humanitarian coverage which is generally assumed to have had an influence and impact upon 
decisions about aid policy. Although many scholars agree that there is now very often a doubt 
about the extent of media effects on the overall policy process, in particular the degree to which 
coverage can result in a military intervention, there has nevertheless been considerable consensus 
between Robinson and others that in the case of humanitarian assistance the media is more 
likely to have a substantial effect. Despite uncertainty about the way that media coverage might 
influence wider foreign policy there was some agreement that in the case of stimulating 
humanitarian action there is a discernable link to the influence of the media reporting of a crisis. 
Indeed Robinson even calls the Ethiopian famine in 1984 ‘a seminal case of the CNN effect 
where media coverage led to an apparent dramatic humanitarian intervention’ (2002). 
The benefit of hindsight provides some interesting insights. Through examining archival 
records and conducting interviews with those who were involved at the time it is possible to 
illuminate the precise ways that media coverage influenced policy, because this kind of analysis 
uncovers motivations and causations which were taking place inside government at the time, 
despite other claims that might have been made, for public consumption. A series of documents 
available through Freedom of Information requests as well as those released to the National 
Archive and available in the written BBC archives at Caversham are useful in shedding light 
upon this question: to what extent did the powerful media coverage, in particular images of 
suffering, have an effect upon decision making within government? 
  
What becomes apparent is the persistent issue that so often foreign policy is influenced 
by and cannot be uncoupled from domestic concerns, that is, responding to the voters. In more 
recent times the memoirs of Bill Gates, the former US Defense Secretary, made the same 
observations that so often it is domestic political pressures which are pivotal concerns in the 
framing of foreign policy (Gates, 2014)—in his case the US involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. As is often the case from examining FOI material it is also evident from studying 
the contemporary documents that there was a distinct contrast in  the ways that the crisis in 1984 
was being discussed in public by the UK government from the concerns and pressures that were 
being raised within private documents and conversations. 
Both the US and the UK Government, by late 1984, had already known about the famine 
in Ethiopia for months, if not years, before the global media coverage arising from the BBC TV 
report by Michael Buerk and Mo Amin on 23 October. The documents make clear that diplomats 
on the ground had, on many occasions, warned their superiors of the problem.
6
 An urgent cable 
had been sent from the US Embassy in Addis to the State Department on 4 April 1984, about the 
prevailing food situation. It stated that ‘a very serious situation could develop in Ethiopia this 
year and we will be remiss if we are not adequately informed and prepared.’7 Meanwhile British 
diplomats had urged that senior figures from the UK should visit and observe the impending 
crisis, but to little avail. NGOs had tried to lobby government based upon the evidence they had 
received from their staff working in the north of Ethiopia, but once again this yielded no 
response. Indeed even a junior minister, Malcolm Rifkind, responding to these reports, had 
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 For example, see the paper headed ‘The Drought in Africa’, prepared for Tim Raison, Minister for 
Overseas Development, 26 July 1984. Obtained under FOI. 
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 Peter Cutler presented his research as The Development of the 1983–85 Famine in Northern Ethiopia, 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1988.  
  
written to colleagues warning of extreme food shortages.
8
 Yet senior officials and ministers did 
not react to these warnings and there was a distinct unwillingness to engage with the issue. 
However on 24 October, the day after the BBC TV news report of the famine, the foreign 
secretary, in a specific response, announced in an emergency statement to the House of 
Commons that in the light of the news about this crisis, the government would donate £5 million 
to famine relief in Ethiopia. The documents make clear that not only had the government long 
known about the famine, they were specifically sponsoring some research in Ethiopia into food 
security issues.
9
 But it was only when the media images appeared on TV that the government 
chose to respond. This is a compelling and clear example of a CNN effect. But the question is 
really, how much substance was there in the response? 
An Ethiopian Drought Group was convened by the Overseas Development 
Administration within the foreign office after the media coverage, which met twice a day and 
had links to Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence. Yet the overwhelming emphasis was to 
respond to public concerns. A contemporary note indicates that within a week of the BBC news 
reports, letters to the prime minister were running at 200 a day (quite substantial in a pre-email 
and social media era).
10
 And this was taken as an indication of the need to acknowledge public 
concern. 
The principal form of assistance that the UK Government and notably the prime minister 
wanted to provide was airlifts of food by the Royal Air Force. It is evident from the 
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 The National Archives Public Record Office ODA 53/5 memo from Malcolm Rifkind to Sir Geoffrey 
Howe 8 October 1984, and memo from Malcolm Rifkind headed ‘Famine in Africa’, 17 October 84. 
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  Cited in Cutler (1988). 
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 TNA PRO OD 53/8, 3November 1984. 
  
contemporary notes and documents
11
 that there was an insistence that the aid should take this 
form, even if it was not necessarily what was being requested or suggested from those on the 
ground by the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission or the NGOs who were most 
closely involved. Furthermore contrary to perceptions, even after the media coverage, it is now 
evident that government provided virtually no additional money and certainly no long-term 
assistance. There was even an instance of that familiar government trick of re-announcing the 
same funding to make it appear as if it was a fresh initiative—so that the minister had then to 
apologise for misleading MPs.
12
 And the Foreign Affairs Select Committee (under a 
Conservative chairman) delivered a stinging report criticizing the government for its meanness in 
dealing with the famine and refusing to authorize any new funding.
13
 
Meanwhile a letter from the prime minister’s office made clear that the airlifts were 
specifically to be funded by the MOD and the ODA and ‘they must settle the costs between 
them.’14 This edict led to considerable inter-departmental bickering.15 
It is not surprising that the famine and requests for emergency aid recurred in Ethiopia a 
couple of years later. Moreover the policy which the UK government did pursue was not a 
reaction to the facts of the famine itself or even media coverage of the famine, but a reaction to 
public opinion’s dramatic response to the media coverage. The Government had strong 
ideological (i.e., anti-Soviet) grounds not to help and so explicitly did what made them look good 
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 Letter from Charles Powell (foreign affairs advisor to PM) to C. R. Budd at Foreign Office, 29 October 
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 TNA PRO OD 53/7 letter from Timothy Raison’s private secretary to the private secretary of Lord 
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domestically and reaped the best possible public relations benefit.
16
 Ethiopia was firmly within 
the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, receiving immense military support from it. The regime 
of Colonel Mengistu operated on extreme authoritarian Communist principles and identified with 
the East European regimes. The guest of honour at the regime’s 10 anniversary celebrations in 
1984, when the media reports first emerged, was the East German leader Erich Honnecker. This 
background was reinforcing the resistance of the UK Government towards providing aid on the 
basis that if Ethiopia was so firmly within the Communist camp, then any assistance needed to 
be carefully weighed up with that in mind.
17
 These calculations are evident in the way that the 
Downing Street and the Foreign Office sought to formulate a policy, once the media images had 
made this an imperative. 
 
Conclusions 
In contrast to the contemporary media perception the government aid provided to Ethiopia was 
pretty much existing money that was reconfigured and, despite appearances, there was no ‘new 
money’ (Franks, 2013). The UK Government rejected any longer term ongoing engagement and 
was just concerned with short-term emergency relief, appearing to be generous in reaction to 
disturbing media images. Furthermore Ministers were concerned that the relief that was provided 
(airdrops of food by RAF planes) should garner the maximum possible domestic political benefit 
and reap the best political dividend vis-à-vis Cold War adversaries. 
18
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 See, for example, confidential briefing note for a House of Commons appearance by Tim Raison. 
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It is apparent from this analysis that the ability of the media coverage to produce change 
in official policy and official assistance was less apparent than might first have appeared. 
Ultimately the impact of the coverage was far more significant upon driving public opinion and 
(with the advent of Band Aid) in the way it changed the nature of charitable giving and private 
philanthropy. So that in terms of policy effects the media on this occasion appears to have a 
greater effect upon the policies and institutions of the voluntary sector and NGOs. If the 1980s is 
considered the ‘decade of the NGO’ (Hellinger, 1987), then the response to the media coverage 
of Ethiopia played a key part in this expansion. 
Thus, we can see that in response to the media coverage of the Ethiopian famine the 
ability of news coverage to push official policy was far less substantial than may have appeared 
at the time. When in successive academic debates the Ethiopian famine is considered historically 
as a case of a ‘strong CNN effect’ that is not strictly speaking true. Public policy did not shift as 
a result of powerful media coverage of suffering. Official humanitarian assistance was severely 
limited and there was no change of heart about development aid. 
Despite superficial appearances not really that much changed as a result of the 
government reaction to the media coverage of Ethiopia. There was a substantial reaction in the 
short term but what the government did was in response to domestic public opinion, which was, 
in turn, reacting to the media coverage. It is evident from FOI documents cited earlier that the 
facts about the famine were well known within government long before autumn 1984. However 
once there was a public reaction to the sudden media coverage this made officials and politicians 
want to be seen to care. So in this case it appears that although there was a CNN effect which 
might have prompted humanitarian action by government, it was primarily for short term 
domestic political effect which was reacting to public opinion within the UK. At this point in the 
  
Cold War and under a Conservative Government there was a strong strategic direction to politics 
which meant that policy decisions were far less likely to change or be influenced by media 
coverage. This is consistent with the literature over the past ten years which points to the rather 
more nuanced influence of the media on wider foreign policy decisions. So that even though the 
CNN effect is perceived to be more likely to happen in the case of providing humanitarian aid, in 
response to media portrayal of suffering, this has not necessarily been the case to the extent that 
has been hitherto anticipated. 
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